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REUBEN G. GUSTAVSON MEMORIAL LECTURES 
The Reuben G. Gustavson Memorial Lectures were 
established in 1975 in recognition of Dr. Gustavson's con-
tributions to education and research. Sponsored by Re-
sources for the Future, Inc., of Washington, D.C., and four 
universities he served, the lectures 'will be given annually 
for fifteen years at the University of Arizona, the University 
of Chicago, the University of Colorado, and the University 
of Nebraska. Contributions to the lecture fund were made 
by Resources for the Future, Laurance S. Rockefeller, Wil-
liam S. Paley, and by former students and colleagues at each 
of the sponsoring institutions. The lectures deal with 
Science and Society, with emphasis on questions related to 
resources and the environment. 
Robert Kates' lecture. the seventh of the series, was deliv-
ered at the University of Colorado on January 27, 1983. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ultimate problems of human existence are problems 
of mystery; the penultimate problems are of survival. The 
ultimate problems-the origin, mcaning, and purpose of a 
human existence that contains the certainty of death-now 
seem to transcend formal human organization dedicated to 
their study and solution. Once the sole charge of priest and 
philosopher, investigation of the mystny of life and death is 
widely shared with science and ordinary men. The penulti-
mate problems-the epoch-specific, O\"(,lTiding questions of 
ollr time-seemingly require greatn formal human organi-
zation (Kates, 1969, p. I). 
I wrote that at the end of 1969, newly returned from 
Africa to a country swept up in the turmoil of foreign \\'ar 
and social change. haying resolved to more systematically 
address my scientific and political efforts to the penultimate 
questions of my ficId, which sLUdies the resources and 
hazards of the human environment. In so doing I was but 
one of many. John Platt (1969) had just published in 
Science his agenda of penultimate problems ordered by a 
scale of crisis intensity Crable I). 
Fourteen years later. no\\' in the midst of his "5 to 20 years 
time to crisis," his list of major crises leading to "annihila-
tion, great destruction, or change" still appears reIn·ant. 
Nuclear or radiological, chemical, biological warfare 
escalates. Around the world men and women take to the 
streets and the ballot box to urge a halt to nuclear arms 
escalation. A major famine affected some 10-15 million 
people in the Sahel bet\\'Cen 1969 and 197:). The end of the 
oceans did not occur in 1979, as predicted in till' cautionary 
tale of eco-catastrophe by Paul Ehrlich (1970); nonetheless, 
major issues concerning ecological balallce persist: the 
interaction of biogeochemical cycles, the future of lTne\\"-
able resources, and the acceleration of species extinction. 
The 1970s found the developmellt hopes of millions set 
back in the face of worldwide economic decline. Local wars 
underway or initiated since 1969 (killing 1,000 or more) 
have involved 58 nations and claimed at least 8.3 million 
lives (Sivard, 1982). The gap between rich and poor nations 
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Crisis Intensity 
(No. Affected) 
Total Annihilation 
(1010) 
Great Destruction 
or Change (109) 
Widespread Almost 
Unbearable Tension 
(108) 
Estimated Time to Crisis (Years) 
1-5 5-20 
Nuclear or RCBW 
Escalation 
(Too Soon) 
Nuclear or RCBW 
Escalation 
Famines 
Ecological Balance 
Development Failures 
Local Wars 
Rich-Poor Gap 
Administrative Poverty 
Management Pollution 
Need for Participation Racial Wars 
Group and Racial Political Rigidity 
Conflict Strong Dictatorships 
Poverty, Rising 
Expectations 
Environmental 
Degradation 
Large-Scale Distress Transportation Housing 
Education 
Independence of 
(107) Diseases 
Loss of Old Cultures 
Big Powers 
Communications Gap 
Tab/(' l. Platt's llJtilJ Classification 01 Major Problems and Crist's 
(abridged from Platt, llJ{jlJ, p. llllJ) 
has increased absolutely if not relatively from a difference 
in per capita income of $2300 in 1969, to $7700 in 1980 
(Sivard, 1982), 
That the agenda of penultimate problems persists is less 
striking than the omissions from the list. Platt, writing 
today, would surely include energy issues and the combina-
tion of global economic stagnation, inflation, and unem-
ployment as major continuing crises that were absent from 
his original list. My own unpublished list of penultimate 
problems prepared that same year is shorter, more envi-
ronmentally oriented, and focuses on cause, It contains three 
closely linked problems: 
I) The Malthusian dilemma, the resurgellt cOllcern with the 
adequacy of resources and environment in the context of 
current and future rates of population growth, and the 
greater growth rates of technology and consumption. 
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2) The growing, separate, global concentration of wealth 
and poverty at a time of continued rising expectations, 
with the prospect of worldwide social unrest and conflict 
increasingly along racial, national, and continental lines. 
3) The exceptional disparity between the greatly advanced 
technological capability for change, including that of 
destruction, and the primitive characwr of the human 
behaviors and institutions prm'iding for control of this 
new capability (Kates, 1969, pp. 3-~). 
In the remainder of this lecture I want to address briefly 
each of these issues in turn, using the hindsight of the last 
14 years, some research that my colleagues at Clark Univer-
sity and I have undertaken on each of the problems, and the 
remarkable set of institutions, research, and documentation 
that developed during that period. A v\ard first about these 
latter developments. 
NEW INSTITUTIONS, RESEARCH METHODS, 
AND DOCUMENTATION 
When John Platt foresaw multiple crises that pose the 
"gravest danger of destroying our society, our world, and 
ourselves in any of a number of different ways well before 
the end of this century," he called for " ... action. Who will 
commit himself to this ... search for more ingenious and 
fundamental solutions? Who will begin to assemble the 
research teams and funds? \\'ho will begin to create those 
full-time interdisciplinary centers that will be necessary for 
testing detailed designs and turning them into effecti\'e 
application?" (1969, p. 1121). 
Fourteen years later a host of interdisciplinary centers 
abound, the most recent being the World Resources Insti-
tute. Internationally, many of these institutes are part of the 
IFIAS (International Federation of Institutes of Ach'anced 
Studies) network. Another, based near Vienna, IIASA (the 
International Institutc for Applied Systems Analysis) is 
funded by 17 countries. The world's natural scientific dis-
ciplines have come together under the aegis of the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Unions and its Scientific 
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Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), 
while the world's nations work through the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) begun in Stockholm in 
1972. New sources of funding have emerged-such as the 
Club of Rome in the early '70s and the MacArthur Founda-
tion in the '80s. Reuben Gustavson, who played such a key 
role in the development of Resources for the Future, would 
have been pleased by these developments. 
In the wake of this creation of institutions has come a 
wave of research, documentation, and methodology. The 
development of global simulation models has triggered a 
new growth controversy that has yet to abate, and a dozen 
emulative or competitiw> models-seven of which were 
recen tl y reviewed together (Meadows, Richardson, and 
Bruckmann, 1982)-have been constructed. The energy cri-
sis encouraged ne\'; accounting systems using BTUs or 
joules instead of dullal~ to dOCUIIIl'Ilt energy flows or trans-
actions. Progress was also made in documenting flows of 
the global cycles of carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, and phos-
phorus in addition to water, and in monitoring the strato-
sphere, oceans, and the terrestrial biomass. Major inter-
national studies and revinvs have looked back at the year 
1972 (Garcia, 1981), over the 10 years since the Stockholm 
Conference on the Environment (Holdgate, Kassas, and 
White, 1982), and forward on the next 20 years (U.S. Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality, 1980), 50 years (Ridker and 
Watson, 1980), 75 years (Freeman and Jahoda, 1978), and 
200 years (Kahn, Brown, and Martel, 1976). 
Despite this outpouring of institutions, research, and 
documentation, a major caveat is in order. In the words of 
the UNEP World Environment report, " ... the data base is of 
very variable quality ... there are startling gaps and a 
special lack of reliable quantitative information on the 
developing world. This must be remembered when projec-
tions of the future state of the world environment are exam-
ined: many are based on only the scantiest of evidence about 
what, in fact, has been happening" (Holdgate, Kassas, and 
White, 1982, p. 622). 
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MENTAL MODELS OF THE FUTURE 
Yet, questionable data appears to me a lesser issue than 
other problems that may perplex the reader of these envi-
ronmental diagnoses and prognoses. A more important 
issue relates to the very different mental models authors 
hold as to the future, differences that can be crudely sum-
marized along three dimensions: trend, cause, and certainty. 
Most people who have thought about the penultimate 
problems have a mental image of the future that is convert-
ible to a trend projection. Consider, for example, this 
incomplete diagram of 1,000 years of past and future world 
population (Figure I). Take a moment and see if you can 
mentally extend it to the year 2050, when my granddaugh-
ter Sara will be 70, or if you are really brave and foolhardy, 
to 2200. 
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Figure I. World Populatioll. 1200-2200 A.D.: Do-It-Yourself Projl'llioll 
Figure 2 shows the curves my students draw. These curves 
reflect well the basic divisions in trend. Curve A is the cor-
nucopian vision of continued exponential growth, at least 
within Sara's lifetime; Curve B represents one of many 
variants of reaching a steady-state, zero-population-growth 
world; and Curve C is the Malthusian vision of overshoot 
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and collapse (Meadows et aI., 1972). All of the analyses since 
1969 are strongly influenced by their authors' vision of the 
potential for either growth, steady state, or collapse. 
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Figure 2. World Population, 1200-2200 A.D.: Altt'rnative Projections 
Beliefs as to the cause of such trends also differ widely. 
Some see physical limits or the behavior of natural systems 
as prime movers; others find cause in society (social or eco-
nomic organization) or culture; still others highlight the 
autonomous role of technology; and still others, combina-
tions thereof. Sometimes the distinctions are subtle, the 
causation must be inferred; sometimes it's blatant, as in 
Nature Pleads Not Guilty, Garcia's indictment of society 
for the worldwide trouble of 1972. 
Finally, the degree of certainty one attaches to a diagnosis 
or prognosis is a mixture of both belief and style. Scientists 
differ in the strength of their own belief in their analyses, 
while others, regardless of belief, may speak either softly or 
loudly. A recurring problem for scientists who wish to 
influence or even to inform is to penetrate the cacophony of 
modern communication, to secure a place on the agendas of 
the media, the public, the decision makers. Thus, some opt 
to speak loudly either from belief or from necessity or both. 
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To overstate your case has become commonplace because to 
understate it may mean it will never be considered. 
These three dimensions-the trends forseen, their causes, 
and the certainty with which they are proclaimed-are 
themselves simplifications, but in combination they trans-
cend the usual dichotomous separation between neo-
Malthusians and anti-Malthusians, growth or no-growth 
advocates, prophets of boom or prophets of gloom, cornu-
copians or catastrophists, or any of the other neat dualisms 
that are curren t these days. That the posi tions are more 
varied, however, does not seem to diminish the rancor evi-
dent in the debate and controversy. 
Having cautioned you to take the analyses of others with 
a grain of three-dimensional salt requires that I locate 
myself along these dimensions. As to trelld, I think we are at 
a key turning point away from exponential growth tov,ards 
a global steady state, but both exponential growth or over-
shoot and collapse can still characterize regional de\'elop-
ment. As to calise, I am an interactionist-nature, society, 
and technology all contribute to our penultimate problems, 
but may vary in importance by problem or setting. As to 
certainty, I am cautious-often skeptical-about evidence, 
but strongminded as to desired values, while always de-
spairing of being able to separate fact from value. 
Let's return to the penultimate problems. In my remain-
ing time, I will address each of the problems in turn, first 
summarizing the major trends of the last H years, then 
presenting some thoughts as to the dynamics or causal pro-
cess that underlies the trends, and then concluding with 
some personal concerns for the future. 
THE MALTHUSIAN DILEMMA 
In 1969, the population problem, some called it a bomb, 
appeared as such in its usual exponential form (Figure 3). 
Here in the early years of the '80s, this penultimate problem 
appears to have changed profoundly. It is now possible to 
visualize the ultimate population of the earth, ultimate at 
least for our lives, our children's, and their children. All 
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major demographers agree that we are at the point of inflec-
tion where an exponential growth curve begins to be the 
S-shaped curve of the logistic. Current estimates (shown in 
Figure 4) differ only in timing and ultimate population, 
but are bracketed between 8 and 11 billion people with a 
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Figure 3. World Populatioll Growth Through History (van del' Tak. 
Haub. and Murphy. 1979. p. 2. Courtesy of the Population Referellce 
Bureau. Inc) 
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global steady state beginning as early as 2050. There are 
exceptions. Lester Brown (1981) tells us we can have a sus-
tainable world of 6 billion people if we have the will and 
foresight, and Herman Kahn (1976) a quadcentennial (2176) 
population of 15 billion, give or take a factor of two. 
12--------~----·----------------------------------------, 
UNITED NATIONS 11.0 
10 9.B WORLD BANK 
--------------------------------
B 
6 
NUMBERS IN BILLIONS 
1----------- STABILIZED SIZE 
2 
OL-______ L-____ ~ ______ ~ ______ _L ______ _L ______ ~ ____ ~ 
1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 2125 2150 
Figure 4. Projections of World Population in 2000 and l'ltimate Stabi-
lized Size (\'an cler Tak. I·!aub. and Murphy. 1979. p. eli!. CourtesY of the 
Population Reference Bureau. Inc.) 
NOTES: Primary sources rdnred to in this graph include: l'.S. Bureau 
of the Census. 1979: World Bank. 1979; l'nited ;'\ations. 1979: Bogul' and 
TSlii. 1979. 
The U.S. Census Bureau has not published projections b('\ond 2000. The 
Worlel Ban k ]lU hI ishes on Iy onl' seril's. Thl' ot her project ions sho\\"n ~IIl' 
meeli lim series (bl't \\'('('n high and lo\\" \'arian ts), 
If, as I think, we arc at the point of inflection, and rates of 
population growth are decreasing, not only in the rich 
industrialized world but in many countries in the Third 
World, then there is some cause for elation. The task of 
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providing a better life for the world's peoples will be 
reduced because the declining population signals some 
improvement in living standards and life expectancy, and 
reduces the burden of providing housing, schooling, and 
jobs for the ncw millions. The decline in birthrate that was 
evidenced in somt' countries during the '70s puts to rest one 
of the deep conflicts in responding to this overriding 
issue-whether a decline in tht' rate of population increase 
must precede or follow economic improvement and reduc-
tion in child mortality. This declint' provides limited sup-
port for all of the three major theories of the demographic 
transition: economic development, birth control, and na-
tional culture. The largest reductions were in nations with 
high rates of development, with strong population control 
policies and actions, and primarily in the culture zone of 
East and Southeast Asia. But population decline occurred 
in lesser degree where only one or t\yO of the three factors 
were present. \Ve learned that population control could 
precede economic development, albeit at a slower rate, at 
least in cultures that prove receptive to it-much as we 
recently learned that French people regulated their popula-
tion, for reasons that are not clear. a ccntury ahead of the 
other nations of Western Europe. beginning prior to the 
industrial revolution. For 100 years. as shown in Figure 5, 
French mothers had a third fewer children than mothers in 
the rest of \\'estt'rn Europe. 
While the transition to a steady-state world is in sight, it 
will be uneven-varying from Europe and North America, 
where 26 nations have essentially achieved zero population 
growth, to Africa. where population will increase tenfold 
over the next 75 years. African demographic exceptional ism 
is particularly evident in projectl'cl growth rates for the year 
2,000, at which time it is expected that 75% of Asian popu-
lations will be growing at very fast rates (2.1 % or higher), 
compared with only 30% of Latin American and 10% of 
Asian populations (Tsui and Bogue, 1978). 
If we stabilize at 10 billion people, there will be cause for 
satisfaction, but quiet at best; the world of 2050 will be a 
world with 2 112 times the current population-with 2 112 
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Fig-url' 5. Index of ;\brital Fellility: Sl'lected European Countri(''>, 17'(1,7-
1960 (van de Walle alld Kllodel. 19'(1,0, p. 17. COUlll''>y of the Population 
Refl'rl'nc(' Bureau, 111(.) 
times the human needs to satisfy, l\'or will that task be 
even I y distri bll ted, Ins lIch a world, Nigeria will ha ve more 
people that the lTnited States or the Soviet Union. This 
map (Figure 6), in which the continents are proportional to 
their population, shows the change in demographic power 
by continental region between 1800, 1980 and after 2050. In 
Year 
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~ § 25 0 III • 
• = 50 D' •• I; 
~~ 75 011_ 
... 
Fig-ure 6. Chang-ing- World Population. 
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1800,1 in 5 persons was a European, 1 in 14 and African. In 
the years following 2050, the figures will be reversed, with 
profound effects on issues of power, migration, and race. 
Nor will the steady state be necessarily a happy state-
western values are rooted in accumulation, achievement, 
and growth. The hierarchy of social organization permitted 
by upward mobility will need to change in a world of more 
limited demands and opportunities. What to replace it with 
will be a major challenge. 
That the turning point in global population was re-
vealed in the 1970s does not, of course, signal an end to the 
Malthusian dilemma, or a reduction in the controversies 
between anti-Malthusian and neo-Malthusian thought. 
The remarkable thing about Mal th us' Essay on Population 
is not that it fits the cynical definition of a classic given by 
Petersen (1979): "a work that everyone ci tes but no one 
reads," but that, despite its repeated refutation, both in the-
ory and observation, it arises anew in each successive intel-
lectual generation by successive expansion of the numerator 
of resources and the denominator of population (Figure 7). 
In 1798, the numerator of the Malthusian equation was 
solely food and agricultural land, not because Malthus was 
ignorant of other natural resource needs, but because food 
requirements so dominated other needs. By the 1850s, how-
ever, the food requirements were expanded to other energy 
and material resources, marked by the classic volume of 
Jevons (1865) in Britain on the coal question, at the same 
time as national censuses made possible expansion of the 
denominator as well. In the United States, the counterpart 
development might have been the plea of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1873 
and 1890 (1890) for forest conservation. Food, however, does 
not disappear; it persists as a concern but on a wider popu-
lation scale. 
The postwar United States would mark a new turning 
point with the Paley Commission report (President's Mate-
rials Policy Commission, 1952), discounting fears as to 
resource scarcity and laying the groundwork for a new defi-
nition of the Malthusian numerator involving amenity 
Resources 
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\PAoliUlion 
\menilies 
Divided By 
\Species 
" Biosphere 
Figure 7. Expanding the Malthusian Equation: Resources Divided by 
Population. 
resources and the pollution-absorbing capacity of the en-
vironment. The Stockholm Conference on the Environment 
in 1972 would enlarge these concerns to a global scale cen-
tered on the biosphere and the basic life-support system of 
biogeochemical cycles. The final extension is the current 
concern with extinction (Regenstein, 1975; Myers, 1979; 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981), and predictions of massive spe-
cies destruction over the next several decades. 
But the earlier definitions by no means disappear; they 
persist. In the 1970s the concern with food adequacy gets 
new life in the context of the Sahelian drought. The con-
cern with energy and material resource adequacy is revived 
by the massive increase in commodity prices during that 
decade and the recognition of the limitations of oil reserves. 
As with the earlier Malthusian predictions, the neo-
Malthusian predictions also fail. A classic case, of course, is 
Jevons (1865) on the coal question. An extrapolation of the 
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growth in coal use from the time he wrote his book is 
shown in Figure 8A along with the actual course of British 
coal production. These figures bear a striking similarity to 
those represented in Figure 8B, a recent projection concern-
ing oil use taken from the Global 2,000 reports extrapolat-
ing 1950-75 oil growth with Hubbert's projection of 
expected U.S. oil production. 
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Figure 8. Extrapolating Coal lIse from 1861, Oil Use from 1975 (Jevons. 
1865: U.S. COllncil on Environmental Quality, 1980) 
Nonetheless. it is safe to predict that neo-Malthusian 
debate will persist, and along these particular lines: food 
adequacy will be of most serious concern in Africa; energy 
adequacy in terms of alternatives for industrialized coun-
tries and in terms of fuel wood and high import prices in 
developing countries; pollution in the megacities of the 
developing world; species in the tropical rain forest; and the 
biosphere in the context of the increasing human modifica-
tion of the atmosphere. 
To sum up the Malthusian dilemma. the last 14 years 
have seen a declining rate of population growth everwhere 
but in Africa, with future projections of a global steady-
state population of from 8-11 billion occurring as early as 
2050. Support is found for all the major theories of the 
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demographic transItIOn debated in the early years of the 
'70s. At the same time, the numerator of concern in the 
Malthusian equation continues to expand and the Malthu-
sian equation is constantly redefined anew, providing 
plenty of concerns for the future. 
GLOBAL CONCENTRATIONS OF 
WEALTH AND POVERTY 
In 1969, average per capita income for the developing 
countries was $204, compared with $2,460 for the indus-
trialized countries, a ratio of 1 to 12. In 1980, the figures had 
risen to $820 and $8,505, respectively, a ratio of 1 to 10 
(Sivard, 1982). In absolute terms the rich had grown much 
richer, but not in relative terms, although the poor were 
still very poor. The worldwide stagflation had taken its toll 
on the industrialized nations' growth, while it had penal-
ized developing countries with an order of magnitude 
increase in oil prices, high interest rates, and low demand 
and prices for most export commodities. 
The penultimate problem of pm'eny and wealth in 1969 
anticipated social disorder and conflict, and there were 
plenty of both in the 1970s, Since 1969, 43 wars claimed at 
least 8.3 million lives (Sivard, 1982), primarily in the poor 
D ~~~:I~~:~nll/lnUdlnll 
••• ,.wlthlncounIr1 •• 
• combined 
Figure 9, Wars, 1969-1981 (after Sivard, 1982) 
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parts of the world (Figure 9). Since 1968, there were 7,425 
internationally related terrorist incidents (U.S. Department 
of State, 1982). Amnesty International kept records on some 
4,952 prisoners of conscience in 1981 (Amnesty Interna-
tional, 1982) and urged action in behalf of prisoners in 67 
countries. Major attempts to ameliorate North-South ten-
sion in the form of the Brandt report (1980), the new eco-
nomic order, aid distribution, or trade concessions basically 
failed. Official development assistance was .34% of indus-
trial nation gross national product (GNP) in 1970, and.35% 
in 1981 (SivaI'd, 1982). The U.S. proportion was second 
lowest among 17 industrial nations and a national disgrace. 
The global concentration of wealth and poverty is fore-
most an issue of political economy, not of the human envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that 
economy and environment interact in at least two impor-
tant ways: on the one hand, economy may prevent the reali-
zation of feasible improvements in the human environment; 
on the other, within specific regional contexts, environment 
often exacerbates the disparity between nations. 
By the end of the '70s, the sociopolitical, rather than the 
technical, obstacles of many environmental issues were 
clear. There was a consensus that, in the aggregate, food 
supplies were adequate to feed all the world's people-
shortages were limited to region or class (Figure 10). Thirty 
percent of the population of low-income countries may be 
malnourished, but poverty rather than environment was 
the prime source. 
Similarly, there is a growing consensus on other issues of 
health andmonality. Based on the experience since 1969, it 
now seems clear that communicable diseases that take the 
lives of 5 million children a year can be eradicated as was 
smallpox (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982); that im-
proved water and sanitation are in reach of the rural peoples 
of the world, as they have been provided for urban people 
(United Nations, 1980); that death from disaster can be 
reduced by at least half, using the best practices currently 
available in developing countries (Burton, Kates and 
White, 1978); and that pollution can be controlled for about 
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1-2% of GNP, as is being done in many industrialized 
nations (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982). In each of 
these areas, there is more knowledge than is currently used; 
what is needed is a lillie wealth and much will. 
Political economy and environment converge to produce 
a class of small, low-income nations that are the poorest-of-
the-poor (Figure II). Indeed, the gap between them and 
o ASIAN MOUNTAIN 
o COASTAL WEST AFRICAN 
~ EASTERN AFRICAN 
~ SAHEL 
_ SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
Figure II. Least-Developed Nations (Clark University Program In 
International Development and Social Changt'o 1974) 
18 / The Human Environment 
other developing nations is growing rapidly, both abso-
lutely and relatively. This is a map of the so-called "least-
developed nations," a dubious accolade, whose criteria (per 
capita GNP, illiteracy, percent manufacturing) were defined 
when I was in the employ of one such nation. With the best 
of intentions, there was hope that identifying this group of 
nations would entitle them to special considerations of 
need in global aid distributions anel in trade adjustments. 
Five years after this designation, home in America, my 
colleagues and I were struck by the nonrandom location of 
these nations. Located mainly in Africa, they are peripheral 
not only to the core centers of world power, but within their 
own regions as well. Their small size, landlockedness, 
regional peripherality, and arid or mountain environments 
combine to enhance the effects of political-economic pov-
erty. It is not environment that makes them poor, but it is 
environment that makes them the poorest-of-the-poor. 
Looking to the future, the most immediate response to 
the global inequalities of wealth will be an ever-accelerated 
pattern of national and international migration reproduc-
ing that which has already occurred in Europe Crable 2) 
Receiving Countries 
Sending West 
Countries Total Germany France Switzerland Belgium Netherlands 
Greece 250 240 
Italy 500 230 100 150 12 
Portugal 510 40 450 
Spain 640 150 330 100 40 20 
Yugoslavia 490 400 55 25 
Total 2,390 1,060 940 280 70 40 
Table 2. European Migration Balances, 1960-1970 (in thousands) 
(Bouvier, Shryock, and Hendnson, 1977, p. l:l. Courtesy of the Popu-
lalion Rdl'reIHl' Bm('au, Inc.) 
"Less than 10,000. 
and North America. The great disparity in numbers be-
tween Europe and Africa will result in massive African 
outmigration, with Africans occupying the migrant worker 
status of current-day Latins. This outmigration is already 
evident in France today (Table 3). In the Americas, the legal 
Nationality 
Algeria 
Portugal 
Italy 
Spain 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
Poland 
Yugoslavia 
Other 
Total 
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Number 
(OOOs) 
884.3 
858.9 
558.2 
531.4 
322.1 
167.5 
86.4 
77.8 
709.5 
4,196.1 
% of Foreign 
Population 
21.1 
20.5 
13.3 
12.7 
7.7 
4.0 
2.1 
1.8 
16.8 
100.0 
Table 3. Foreign :\'ationals in Francl'. 197ti (in thousands) (Boll\'ier. 
Shryock, and Hl'ndl'rson. 1977. p. l:l. Courtl'sy of the Population Refer-
ence Bureau, Inc.) 
and illegal migration across the permeable U.S. border will 
accelerate, illegal migration at the Mexican frontier having 
recently doubled in direct response to the devaluation of the 
peso. One recent projection (Davis, 1982) of a I.S million 
annual immigration to the United States, which is only a 
half again larger than current estimates of immigration 
(legal and illegal), sees an Hispanic-Black-Asian majority 
in the United States by the middle of the next century. 
These massive migrations will bring fresh energy, new cul-
ture, and old issues of power, exploitation, and racism to 
most of the wealthy world. 
To sum up, the rich grow richer absolutely, less so rela-
tively, as an ever more important gap appears among the 
poor countries. with the emergence of a persistent group of 
least-developed countries. In such a world, social disorder is 
commonplace. and unmet human needs mock the great 
potential for the betterment of human existence. The basic 
causes, rooted in political economy, arc beyond my compe-
tence to analyze, but un met human needs could be met with 
modest reallocation of resources and national leadership. 
The least-developed nations remain so. their problems 
exacerbated by environmental and spatial location. The 
gaps will be most evident between Africa and the rest of the 
world, and the accelerating migration from poor to rich 
countries will bring new problems and opportunities. 
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THE SOQALCONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY 
There is a basic asymmetry between the benefits and risks 
of a technology. With the exception of those technologies 
the function of which is to kill or destroy (weapons, chain 
saws, pesticides, antibiotics), most technologies only create 
hazards incidental to their production and beneficial use. 
Thus the identification of a technological hazard and social 
efforts to control it inevitably lag behind a given technol-
ogy's use. The vested interests of both technology sponsor 
and consumers further restrain social control. 
In the 1970s, the lag between technology development 
and hazard control diminished considerably both for old 
and new technologies. This is shown for 6 hazards in Fig-
ure 12. In the United States, for example, much of the '70s 
was marked by the discovery of the "hazard-of-the-week"-
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Figure 12. Technological Development and Hazard Control (based on 
estimates by M. Morrison, Clark University) 
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between 40-50 new or newly discovered hazards were fea-
tured in the media each year. This increase in hazard 
management arose from several sources. 
Commoner (1971) argued that changes in technology 
since World War II have been fundamental and disjunctive, 
not simply the continuation of processes initiated by the 
industrial revolution. The most dramatic technological 
threat was the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945. 
Less dramatic, but also significant, was the synthesis, large-
scale production, and disposal of thousands of new chemi-
cals, and the mobilization and concentration of fossil 
energy and naturally scattered materials. 
While one may argue about whether World War II 
represents a technological watershed and that the spate of 
hazard identification is the delayed recognition of the perils 
of progress, there have also been major improvements in 
the ways in which hazards are identified and monitored. 
These include new screening techniques with low-cost 
tests; computer modeling of hazardous sources, pathways, 
and sinks; monitoring networks for major air, land, and 
water pollutants; and rapid growth in general scientific 
effort devoted to hazard research. 
Along with the disjunctive change in technologies and 
improved means of hazard identification, the public, too, 
has become more sensitive to hazard. More than 78% of the 
public perceive greater risk today than in the last 20 years, 
contrary to the expectations of most experts (Harris, 1980). 
The source of this changing public perception is not 
wholly clear. Part of it lies in the actual and identified 
increase in hazardous technologies and in the attention 
provided to them by both scientists and the media. But there 
are also deeper roots: the concern with radiation and chem-
icals may be replacing older insecurities, enhanced by the 
periodic fluctuations of optimism and despair in public 
mood, and by the politics of liberalism and conservatism. 
Whether pu blic perception matches the reality of hazard, 
the burden of hazard on society is a large one. In the United 
States alone, the estimated social costs of hazards associated 
with the manufacture and use of technology-including 
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property damage, losses of productivity from illness or 
death, and most but not all of the costs of control-
amounted to between $179 and $283 billion in 1979 (Table 
4), equivalent to 7.8%-12.4% of GNP (Tuller, forthcoming). 
Cost To Cost of Control Damage and Loss 
Private Sector 67.4-80.4 
Federal Government 21.7-34.8 
State and Local 
Government 11.0-17.3 Not Available 
Public 31.7-52.1 
Total 99.1-132.5 79.8-150.2 
Total Costs and Losses 178.9-282.7 
Table 4. Social COSLS. Damages. anJ Losses from Technological 
HazarJs. 1979 (in millions of Jollars) (TlIlln. forthcoming) 
Similarly, from 15% to 25% of the annual mortality is asso-
ciated with \'arious technologies (Harriss, Hohenemser, 
and Kates, 1978). No similar analyses have been done else-
where in the world, but there is every reason to believe that 
such patterns of damage and loss w(ndd be found equally in 
most industrialized countries and in urban areas of develop-
ing countries, ,,\'here the damage estimates might even be 
greater. 
Despite this large toll, there are grounds for cautious 
optimism. Most acute effects (e.g., accidental injury) of 
technology have been on the decline or have held relatively 
constant. Cancer rates, with three exceptions (declining 
stomach and uterine, rising lung cancer), have been rela-
tively constant, although studies claim a significant in-
crease in the 1970-76 period in the United States, with later 
data still unavailable (Schneiderman, 1982). Significant 
progress in the United States has been made in reducing 
levels of 3 of the 5 major air pollutants (Conservation 
Foundation, 1982), and national surveys, while revealing 
epidemic proportions of deleterious blood-lead levels in 
children, demonstrate nevertheless a marked and gratifying 
decrease (Figure 13). The llNEP World Environment re-
port finds that despite rising human impacts on natural 
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systems, the overall short-term productivity of soil, ocean, 
and forest has not been significantly impaired (Holdgate, 
Kassas, and White, 1982). Thus, for technologies whose 
consequences are immediate, whose sources are identifi-
able, and whose mechanisms are reasonably well under-
stood, the problem of achieving a tolerable level of risk is 
expensive and challenging but acceptable. a concomitant to 
the widespread beneficial use of modern technology. 
More difficult to deal with are acute hazards of a rare 
catastrophic nature, or slow and cumulative hazards of 
great persistence, spread, or toxicity. Our recent compari-
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son of 93 technological hazards has identified 5 sets of 
extreme hazards, 4 of which represent difficult types to cope 
with (Table 5). These 4 are intentional biocides, the persist-
ent, delayed teratogens, the rare catastrophes, and the dif-
fuse global threats. The fifth group is composed of 
common killers, such as automobiles or black-lung disease. 
Class 
I. Hazards 
II. Extreme Hazards 
1. Intentional Biocides 
2. Persistent Teratogens 
3. Rare Catastrophes 
4. Diffuse Global Threats 
5. Common Killers 
III. Multiple Extreme Hazards 
Examples 
Appliances, Aspirin, Bicycles, 
Saccharin, Skateboards 
Antibiotics, Chain Saws, 
Vaccines 
Mercury, Uranium Mining 
Aviation Crashes, LNG 
Explosions 
Fossil Fuel·COlo Ozone 
Depletion 
Auto Crashes, Coal Mining 
Nuclear War, Pesticides, 
Recombinant DNA 
Table 5. Taxonomy of Tcchnolo?;ical f lat_anls 
The intentional biocides derive their lethality from the 
great toxicity involved in the design of technologies to hUrl 
living organisms: humans in the case of wc-apons, insects 
with pesticides, vegetation with herbicides and chainsaws, 
and bacteria and viruses with drugs. Highly efficient, these 
technologies are usually narrowly targeted and access to 
them is restricted. But, if by error of decision or application 
or by intention, they drift off target, then they are enor-
mously dangerous. Thus, in our time we have already seen 
nuclear war in Japan, massive pesticide poisoning in Paki-
stan, and worldwide penicillin-resistant strains of 
gonorrhea. 
Persistent, drlayed teratogen.s and mutagens comprise a 
class of hazards whose inherent danger arises from the po-
tentiating combination of characteristics, each of which is 
threatening but manageable by itself. The combination of 
long life for the material, long delay until consequences 
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appear, and transgenerational impact make them so haz-
ardous. Metals such as cadmium, selenium, antimony, mo-
lybdenum, lead, and mercury have human-created fluxes of 
between 5 LO 80 times those found in nature. All of these can 
accumulate slowly, and persist almost forenT to cause se-
rious disruption to living organisms, especially fetuses. 
Several are also mutagenic. Heavy mClals and radiation 
have already caused numerous outbreaks and a fl'\\' major 
epidemics such as mercury-caused MinamaLa disease in 
Japan and the seed-grain mass poisoning in Iraq. 
For most of the rare catastrophes the mechanisms are well 
understood: a jumbo jet collision, collapsC' of a dam, a 
n uclC'ar reaClor accidelll, an Ll\' G (I iq uelied nat ural gas) 
tank explosion. or the fall of a satellite. WC' haH' alread\' 
had a number of major dam failures, only one jumbo jet 
collision, a single LNG tank explosion. and near misses 
with satC'llites and nuclear reactors. Howe\'C'r, for some 
potential catastrophes such as the accidental creation of a 
virulent microorganism using recombinant DNA technol-
ogy, the threat. while possible. is almost impossible LO 
assess rdiably or pC'rhaps C'vC'n to verify if it did occur. 
Finally, thert' are the dijju.\(' global threats caused by 
matC'rials worlll\\'ide in their disbursement that slowly but 
steadily accumulate mainly in or through thC' atmosphC're 
and threaten to change the climate, destroy the protC'ctive 
ozone layer, or increase the acidity of precipitation. The 
threats are idelllifiable, but much scientific uncertainty still 
remains rC'garding the spcC'd at which they are evolving, the 
sourcc:'s, thC' mechanisms, anclthe impacts. We do know that 
the annual release of C02 into the atmosphere is equal to 
about 10% of that used by plants; nitric oxidC's and nitrate 
products produced by human sources are about 50% of what 
the biosphere produces naturally. and more sulphur diox-
ide enters the atmosphere from human activities than is 
exchanged naturally (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982). 
This taxonomy of hazards lends itself to a priority list or 
to a hazard agenda (recall Table 5). A few hazards are ex-
treme in more than one of the 5 dimensions-for example, 
the radiation effects of nuclear war, recombinant DNA, and 
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some pesticides. Most hazards are not extreme in any 
dimension, for instance, saccharin, aspirin, household 
appliances, or skateboards. In between are examples of 
hazards that are extreme in one or another major group. 
This suggests a modified form of "triage": extraordinary 
attention to the multiple extreme hazards, distinctive effort 
appropriate to each of the groups of extreme hazards, and 
an ordered but routine response for the remainder. 
The years ahead should bring a continuation of the help-
ful trends of the '70s despite some of the current retreat from 
caution. The public has been remarkably consistent in its 
desire for environmental protection and health safety (Fig-
ure 14). However, a diminution in the publicly recorded 
fears for the future will not occur until we understand the 
Percent 
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Figure 14. Public Pnception of Environll1elllal Laws and Regulations, 
1973-1981 (Conservation Foundation. 1982a. p. ·125. Courtesy of the 
Conservation Foundation and the American Entnprise Institute) 
NOTE; The primary source of the information repn'seilled in the graph 
reproduced I)('re is the Roper Organization Polls, 1973-1981. The ques-
tion asked was; Thert' art' ... differing opinions about how far we've 
gone with environmental protection laws and regulations, Atthe present 
time, do you think environmel1lal protection laws and regulations have 
gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance? 
"Don't know/no answer" responses (not plotted) ranged between 10% 
and 21%. 
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mechanisms of the major human diseases of industrial 
countries (cancer and atherosclerosis), determine the effects 
on the biosphere of human-induced changes in energy and 
materials flow, and learn to control the irrational insecurity 
of the arms race. 
In the developing world the situation is more worrisome. 
Technologies that are tightly controlled in industrial coun-
tries, such as pesticides or antibiotics, are readily available 
in many developing countries. The great urban centers of 
the Third World display patterns of auto injury or pollu-
tion that exceed those of many wealthy cities, and at the 
same time they maintain an environment of infectious dis-
ease and malnutrition comparable to or exceeding those of 
rural areas. In the year 2000, there may be 61 such cities 
with populations exceeding 4 million, including Mexico 
City with 32 million people, S~lO Paulo with 26 million, 
and 8 others with over 15 million people. 
For the industrialized countries, I find particularly troub-
ling the structural changes taking places in the roles of 
scientist, technologist, and entrepreneur and in the basic 
division of labor among scientific discovery of principles, 
technological de\'elopment of devices or processes using 
them, and entrepreneurial production and distribution. 
There is an inevitable lag between hazard creation and 
hazard identification. Scientists, knowledgeable about the 
basic principles of a technology but uninvolved in its 
development, serve to provide early warning and identifica-
tion of hazard. But in the three major technologies of the 
last 40 years, this has broken down: in the creation of the 
atom bomb, in computer and related information technol-
ogies, and in the emerging biotechnology. In the first case, 
the dual wartime role of the scientist and technologist that 
created the bomb ended for some scientists rather quickly. 
These then became "critical scientists,"to use Ravetz's term 
(1971), and many of them served and continue to serve to 
warn us of the dangers of the arms race. 
In contrast, the subtle consequences, both good and bad, 
of the information revolution have not emerged yet. Indeed, 
we still know surprisingly little about television's effects 
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after 20 years of intensive study (Graham and Kasperson, 
forthcoming). Fortunately, the first-order consequences of 
information technologies do not appear to affect health and 
environment directily (with the exception of radiation and 
certain chemicals). 
Most troubling of all for me is the emergent biotechnol-
ogy, but not because I possess expert knowledge of its 
hazards. What disturbs me is the structure of the technology, 
with scientific experiments, technological development, 
and entrepreneurial production collapsed into a continu-
ous activity, and those most knowledgeable playing all three 
roles in a rush to early discovery, innovation of use, and 
profit. Theoretically, biotechnology is extremely powerful, 
and I worry that even the much-improved societal hazard 
management developed in the last decade cannot cope with 
its challenge in the face of the massive co-optation of the 
relevant scientific community. 
To sum up, despite an expanding technology and grow-
ing hazard perception, there are encouraging signs of 
improving social control, albeit at a high cost of between 
7-12% of equivalent GNP. The basic lag between benefit 
and hazard identification is diminishing even though the 
new hazards are more subtle and less evident, supported in 
part by the increased social sensitivity-some would argue 
hypersensitivity-to hazard. It is now possible to draw up 
an agenda of particularly hazardous types based on physi-
cal, biological, and social characteristics. Worrisome for the 
future is the consolidation of roles in technology develop-
ment as exemplified in the emerging biotechnology and the 
ready diffusion of hazardous technology in the Third World 
without the institution of social control. 
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CONCLUSION 
By profession I am a worrier, a scientific worrier in my 
chosen corner of the human environment. I try to measure, 
weigh, and anticipate what to take seriously, what to 
ignore, what to act upon, and what to study more. The 
penultimate problems of human existence are mega-
worries, and tonight I have reported on their state over the 
14 years since I began systematically to contemplate them. 
By personality, I am an optimist, but I worry about the 
interaction of personality and profession-does my internal 
biology of hope (Tiger, 1979) distort my scientific judg-
ment? Yet I must report hope, surely for at least two of the 
three penultimate problems. A historic turning point has 
been reached in world popUlation numbers. There is a 
growing competence in the social control of technology in 
industrialized countries. Even the disparity between rich 
and poor has slowed, albeit in a surprising way by the 
humbling of the rich rather than the elevation of the poor. 
Yet there is still much cause for concern: 
I) It is overwhelming to find that our leaders continue to 
engage in the endless overkill of the arms race. 
2) It is frustrating to know the potential to eliminate death 
from hunger, disease, and disaster and how little that po-
tential has been realized. 
3) It is worrying that in the aggregate we still know so little 
about the impans of the 3 great technological innova-
tions of the last half century. 
As a professional worrier, I recently had a surpnsmg 
interchange with an old friend in the course of doing a 
videotape interview. She asked me: "As you look to the 
future, what is the thing you fear most and what is the 
thing you hope most?" I hemmed and hawed, thought fran-
tically, mentally reviewed my current list of 17 natural and 
93 technological hazards, and then spontaneously blurted 
out "The loss of hope, and the loss of idealism." 
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If we come to accept the inevitability of nuclear war, the 
persistence of hunger and disease, the mindless autonomy 
of technological change, then they surely will come to pass. 
It is only that curious mixture of faith and necessity that we 
call hope that can keep the penultimate problems in their 
place. 
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